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u2u  -in2ry  f-indings
the  iftAnemali  microfirm  seector is believed  to be large,  that  ensure  property  rights,  pool  risk,  or enforce
accounting  for 20-40  percent  of employment  in many  contracts  become  more  important  as a firm  grows,  and
dcveloping  countries.  The  literature  tends  to view  the  the  entrepreneur  will be willing  to  pay for them  through
sector  as the disad-vantaged  sector  of a seg-nented  labor  "taxes"  in a way that  was not  the  case as a small firm.
market,  as existing  to evade  government  regulations,  or  The  combination  of these  assurnptions  generates
as constrained  by lack of access to government  services.  several  of the stylized  facts  emerging  from  cross-sectional
Levenson  and M.aloney offer  a unique  theoretical  data  and  identified in existing  mrdels  -informal  firms
framework  to analyze  iinformality  and microfirm  growth  tend  to) remnailn  small  and have  high rates  of mortality5
behavior  - one that  emphasizes  the entrepreneurial  and  lower  productivity  --  without  recourse  to
nature  of  infor-rmal firms and  sees informality  as a  government-induced  distortions  ia  labor  or  product
secondary  characteristic.  markets.  Further,  the framework  predicts  that  firms
First,  they  assume  that  inforinal  firms in developing  whose  cost structures  dictate  that  they  should  expand
countries  bave dvnarniics similar  to firms  in industrial  will make  the  transition  to formality  as they  grow.
countries:  entrepreneurs  have  uinobserved,  differing  cost  Using  detailed  observations  fromn  Mexico,  Levenson
structures  that  determine  the&r long-run  size and survival  and  Maloney  find their  view  consistent  with  patterns  of
- strocru:i-es rhat tihev can only  discover  by going  into  formality  and  growth  of .nicrofirrns.
busiress.
Secornd, informality  can be thought  of as a decision  to
participate  in societal  instituLticns. Access to mechanisms
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,Crude  estimates  suggest  that the informal  production  sector  is large,  accounting  for 20 to
50 percent  of employment  in many  developing  countries  (Portes, 1994).  Yet progress  towards
consensus  on the sector's origins,  operations  and even  definition  has been hampered  by two
problems.' First, the lack of comprehensive  data has prevented  accurately  establishing  the basic
characteristics  of informal  production  beyond conjecture  and casual  observation.  Second,
whereas,  the literature on informal finance -- i.e. unregulated financial intermediation -- has a
broad  theoretical  underpinning, 2 the literature  on informal  production  tends toward ad hoc
characterizations  and lacks a comparably  broad  foundation. 3 In general,  these  frameworks  rely on
an institutional  distortion  such as a binding  minimum  wage,  evasion  of government  regulation
and taxation,  or differences  between  firms in worker  monitoring  ability  to generate  the informal
sector. 4
This  paper makes two contributions.  First, it offers systematically  collected  data on a
broad  cross-section  of urban  firms in Mexico  with details  on compliance  with or participation  in
a number  of different  societal  institutions.  The data are derived  from a nationally  representative
sample of all such firms, a significant  improvement  over pre-existing  case study data sets. We
are thus able to move  beyond anecdotal  analysis  and establish  some  definitive  stylized  facts
about irnformal  production  for the first time.
Second,  it offers  a theoretical  framework  to motivate  the analysis  of the data. The
'A  large body of literature equates informality with the low-wage, low-productivity segment of a dual
labor market (for example, Lewis, 1954, and Harris and Todaro, 1970). An equally sizeable literature equates
informality with unregulated self-employment (for example, Hart, 1972, and de Soto, 1989). See Thomas (1992)
and Portes (1994) for excellent overviews. Our approach in this paper equates informality and noncompliance with
societal norms such as tax obligations, labor protections, census enumerations, business guild participation, etc.  In
line with both Thomas' and Portes' characterizations, we are concemed with unregulated/umnonitored activities that
are ostensibly legal, not those that are truly illegal (criminal).
^ See Besley (1995) for an excellent overview.
See Thomas (1992) and Portes (1994). Exceptions include Esfahani and Salehi-Isfahani (1989), Rauch
(1991), Loayza (1995), and Banerji and Jain (1996).
4 For the remainder of the paper we will use "informal" exclusively to characterize the production and
distribution of goods processes.approach  is unique  because  it assumes  that informal  firms behave  no differently  from small firms
in industrialized  counties  and that  no institutional  or governmental  distortions  are required  to
generate  their behavior.  To this end  the analysis  builds on recent  mainstream  empirical  and
theoretical  research  on firm  dynamics  and extends  it to incorporate  a general concept  of
formality.  The traditional  view of tax and regulatory  compliance  is that government  enforcement
is the sole determinant. 5 In contrast,  we argue that voluntary  compliance  may arise because  the
firm  derives  either  direct  or complementary  benefits  from participating  in a particular  societal
institution.
Several  appealing  results  emerge.  First, the framework  is able  to generate  many of the
cross-sectional  patterns of firm  and worker  behavior  addressed  by existing  models  and those
found in our data. Second,  previous  approaches  have been  static: firms  are either  formal  or
informal  and none transition  in equilibrium.  However,  empirical  evidence  suggests  that
developing  country  (LDC)  firms share  some  of the evolutionary  dynamics  of their industrialized
country  counterparts.  We show  that these dynamics  may  be important  when analyzing
informality  because  they can generate  firm characteristics  commonly  associated  with the
formality-informality  comparison.  Moreover,  such dynamics  imply equilibrium  transitions  from
informality  to formality.  The nature  of the data employed  does not permit  following  individual
firms  over time and hence precludes  rigorous  testing  of the dynamic  predictions.  However,  we
add a new dimension  to the theoretical  literature  and the predicted  cross sectional  patterns  are
supported  empirically.  Finally,  the framework  can nest many of the existing  conceptions  of
informality,  including  models  that generate  the sector  through  governmental  or institutional
distortions.
I. Formality  as participation  in civic institutions
Different  contributions  in the literature  view compliance  with or participation  in the
institutions  of society  in seemingly  inconsistent  ways. Some  emphasize  firms' desires  to evade
taxes, regulations  or other state controls  (for  example,  Loayza, 1995).  Others see  the inability  to
' For example see Ashenfelter and Smith (1979), Fenn and Veljanovski (1988), Cowell (1990).
2access institutions,  such as those securing  property  rights, as hampering  firm growth  (for
example,  de Soto, 1989).  Further  there tends  to be an assumption  that formality  is an all or
nothing state.  We argue  that these views are valid only as special  cases  of a more general  and
continuous  relation  between  the firm and society.
WVe  recast the question  of formality  as the firm's decision  of how much to participate  in
the numerous  institutions  of civil society:  federal  and local treasuries,  governmental  programs
such  as social security  (including  pensions  and health  care), the legal system,  the banking
system,  health  inspection,  firm  censuses,  trade organizations,  civic organizations,  etc. We argue
that a minimal  degree  of participation  in some  institutions  is a necessary  input  to growth  for
many firms,  and that participation  increases  with the success  of the business.  That is, formality
can be viewed  as a normal input  to production:
q = f(L,K,P),
where  L,  is labor,  K is capital,  and P is participation  in (a number  of different)  societal
institutions,  and all three inputs  are complementary.  The benefits  of formality,  while often
overlooked,  are numerous.  They include,  but are not limited  to: 6
1.  Enforceable/impersonal  contracts  and credible  signaling.  All entrepreneurs  have
access  tD social  relationships  to enforce  implicit  contracts  among  their friends  and family,  who
form a small number  of their potential  customers  and employees.  Participation  in the legal
system is needlessly  expensive  for transactions  with these individuals.  Similarly,  old age and
health  insurance  may be easily handled  by insuring  through  their mutual extended  network  of
friends and  family.  Property  rights  secured  by personal  ties may be sufficient  if investment  is
minimal.  These characteristics  of small scale economic  transactions  are commonly  observed  in
developing  countries,  as well as in many ethnic  enclaves  in developed  countries.  But this mode
of operation  is constrained  by the ability of the entrepreneur  to maintain  personal  relations  with
all involved  parties,  a task increasingly  unmanageable  as firms  expand.  Legally  recognized,
enforceable  contracts  lend credibility  to arrangements,  permit entry into long term commitments,
diminish  risk, and can reduce  monitoring  costs. For example,  in a world of imperfect
6 See also  de Soto (1989).
3information, certification that the firmn  complies with government health and safety codes may be
necessary for firms to attract the largest customer base possible. 7 Larger investments require that
property rights be secured through the legal system.
2. Access to capital. Informal capital markets (Besley, 1995) may be sufficient to fulfill
the firm's external financing needs at low levels of production. However, the small scale and
undiversified nature of informal capital markets makes them unsuitable for satisfying the firm's
financing needs at larger scales of operation. Growing firms will turn to formal financial
intermediaries such as banks.
3. Access to public risk-pooling mechanisms. In order to attract good quality workers the
firm may have to offer fringe benefits such as workers compensation, health/unemployment/
disability insurance, and pensions. However, uncertainty over the expected costs of these benefits
is high for risk pools with limited numbers of participants, i.e. small firms. Indeed, there is
evidence that United States firms backed the introduction of a workers' compensation system to
decrease the risk of self-insuring against individual claims (Fishback and Kantor, 1996). Hence,
even in the absence of mandatory enrollment laws, a firm may want to enroll in govermment
programs that pool risks over a larger population than its own employees.
In exchange for this participation, society imposes "taxes" such as reporting
requirements, 8 fiscal obligations, or social insurance payments. We can conceive of these as
comprising an initial fixed cost po  that may include information or initial registration costs such
as those documented by de Soto (1989), and per period costs, pt, such as taxation that we assume
7 While we frame the empirical discussion in terms of formal versus informalfirms,  the concept of
informality also applies to subsets of transactions that an ostensibly formal firm may undertake. For example, Palay
(1984, 1985) shows that certain transactions between rail-freight shippers and their clients in the United States can
be characterized as informal because they occur outside the bounds defined by regulation, and hence are legally
unenforceable. In keeping with our motivation here, we would expect such informal transactions to take place
primarily between two parties that have a long-standing relationship, even if both parties are large firms and not
individual people. A different perspective is offered by Portes (1994) who notes that a portion of economic activity
at officially-sanctioned firms often goes unreported; that portion of transactions should be considered informal.
8 This is particularly relevant for bank financing. The firm may have to become registered when it seeks
such financing: the govemment may require the bank to report the identity of all its loan recipients for tax or other
purposes.
4for simplicity are the same for all firms. 9 We initially assume that the market for formality is
voluntary (society levies no costs on firms that choose not to participate in an institution) and
that non-payers are perfectly excluded (no free riders). While extreme, these assumptions are
consislent with voluntary health or social security programs, and business associations. For
example, Chile's self-employed are offered the choice of whether to participate in the state social
security program (The Economist, 1996).
Just as importantly, our approach highlights an important effect that is not considered by
the standard approach in the literatures on tax evasion and regulatory compliance (for example,
CowelL,  1990, Fenn and Veljanovski, 1988). These assume that enforcement is the only
determinant of compliance because no private benefit is derived from participation: the
institution is treated as a strict public good. However, there may be private benefits that make
compliance in many public institutions voluntary. In the mandatory workers' compensation
system example cited above, the'private benefit of participation outweighed the private cost for
many, if not all, firms. De Soto claimed that Peruvian sidewalk vendors sought, not to avoid but,
to pay taxes as a way to establish property rights over their precarious business locations. In
reality, though the direct private benefit from paying taxes may be zero (again, assuming no
enforcement penalties), there may be ancillary benefits that make compliance worthwhile.'0
This very stylized concept of participation can now be embedded in a model of firm
dynamics that has become popular in the industrial organization literature." A number of the
existing models of the informal sector (e.g  Rauch, 1991) are motivated by Lucas' (1978) model
9pt  could increase  with finn size,  i.e. p, = r(q).q.  So  long as d T/dq  < 0, the basic conclusions  about
participation  and firm size and age would  not change.
O Even in cases  where  the private  benefit  of participation  does  not exceed  the private  cost,  the net private
cost  may differ substantially,  leading  to different  probabilities  of compliance  conditional  on a given level of
enforcernent  resources.  For example,  it may  be quite  difficult  for a frm to undo  the effects of a binding  minimum
wage if ithe  compensation  package  does not include fringe  benefits  that can be reduced  when  the wage is raised.  In
contrast,,  it may be easier  for the firm to comply  with  mandated  health,  pension  or other  benefits  programs  by
adjusting  the wage without  significantly  altering  labor  input  (for example,  Gruber,  1994).  Our general  point is that
the probability  of compliance  is a positive  function  of the relative  private  benefit  of participation  (net of private
costs).
"  See also Lippman  and Rumelt  (1982) and Ericson  and Pakes  (1995).
5of the size distribution  of firms. Lucas  argued  that there is a distribution  of entrepreneurial  ability
in the population:  Those  with a sufficiently  high level of proficiency  become  entrepreneurs,
while the rest become  wage workers.  Among  the entrepreneurs,  those  who are more  proficient
have  firms  that are larger and/or more successful.  However,  the model  is static: firms  do not
grow or fail, nor are they born;  no one transitions  between  wage  work and self-employment  in
equilibrium.
Jovanovic  (1982)  addressed  these limitations  by further  assuming  that entrepreneurs
have  uncertainty  over  their firms' true costs of production:  Their precise  entrepreneurial  ability
initially  is unknown  and can only be learned  gradually  over time by actually  operating  a
business.  Potential  entrepreneurs'  idiosyncratic  entrepreneurial  ability,  0, affects  their costs,
c(qt)xt,  through  a multiplier  xt(0+e£),  where  c(q) is convex," 2 q is output,  and et  are random  firm
specific  shocks  that  prevent certain  knowledge  of 0. Entrepreneurs  make their best guess of x,'
(the expectation  of x, conditional  on information  received  prior to time t), pay a one time fixed
cost of entry, and thereafter  choose  a level of output  qt to maximize  expected  profits:
maxq[Ptq 1 - c(q)x,  ]  (1)
where  P, is the (price-taking)  firms' output price. Each period firms  get new information  on their
cost structure  from the level of profits.  Firms that realize  profits above  their expected  level revise
downward  their estimate,  xte,  because
a  -e  =  c(q)(x  - xe)  (2)
This yields  two important  predictions.  First, Jovanovic  showed  from equation  (1) that
-=  - < 0  (3)
sxe  X1eC I
t;  t C1 
12 That  is, c'(q)>O,  c"(q)>O, c(O)=O, c'(O)=O.
6which, given  the properties  of the cost function,  implies that a lower  cost multiplier  raises  the
level of'output.  Thus, longstanding  firms  differ in size  because some  firms  discover  that they are
more ef'ficient  than others. Since  participation  is a normal  input in the production  process,  the
distribution  of formality  among  established  firms  reflects the underlying  distribution  of 0.
Second,  this learning  process  broadly  defines  firms' trajectories  of growth  and formality
over time. Unexpectedly  good information  on profits leads  to a downward  revision in xe,+,  and a
rise in qt+,  above qt; i.e. the firm grows. It also permits more precise estimates of 0, making
viable firms  more confident  that they will survive.  Both elements  influence  the choice of the
degree  of participation:  A firm will choose  to become  formal  if the discounted  benefit net of pt
across  Ihe expected  lifetime  of the firm  exceeds  the fixed costs,  po.
Figure 1 presents  three highly stylized  alternate  firm  trajectories." 3 A new small firm  that
realizes  profits that suggest  a high xet+i  will stop growing  at a relatively  small size.  These "Type
2" firms -- the small survivors -- include businesses such as corner grocery stores, push cart
vendors,  and door-to-door  sales operations  with relatively  high 0. Given  the relatively  low
benefits  of formality  for small firms,  the expected  discounted  present  value of participation  may
not exceed  po  until the firm is very confident  about  its long run viability,  if ever.
In contrast,  a firm  realizing  large unexpected  profits will sharply  revise downward  its xet+i
and set q + much higher than q, These "Type 1" businesses in Figure 1 -- the large survivors --
also start small but rapidly  expand  to a large  long-run  size.  Examples  of this type of firm  are
mediurn-  to large-scale  manufacturing  plants and wholesale  trade warehouses.
Finally,  Type 3 firms  are the false starters  that quickly learn  that they are unprofitable,
and fail.' 4 The population  of young  firms contains  a disproportionate  number  of such  firms  that
have not yet received  enough signals  on 0 to figure out that they are not viable. The combination
of their small size and uncertainty  about  being able to recoup  po  over their expected  lifetime
makes them unlikely  to choose  to become  formal.
13 Those shown in Figure I are for illustrative purposes and do not exhaust the range of possible firm  types.
'4 Jovanovic showed that there exists a maximum level of the cost multiplier, or "failure bound," x*+,:
firms that realize x'+, > x',+, shut down..
7Figure 2 presents these relations in a very stylized fashion. It shows alternate expansion
paths -- with and without participation in a societal institution -- for the types of firrn from Figure
1. The expansion paths with participation are net of the variable costs of participating, Pt, and
have been drawn so that the percentage increase in revenue is approximately the same for firm
types 1 and 2. Comparable proportionate increases in net revenue for small and large firms is a
reasonable assumption given that participation is a complement to the other inputs to production.
However, as explained below, it is not crucial for the key conclusions to be drawn from the
analysis.
One feature of the Jovanovic model is that there is a common failure bound for all firms
in an industry, a size below which no firm can profitably operate. Large firms are farther from
the failure bound, so they have a higher survival probability. This translates into a longer
expected lifetime at any given age. Suppose D is the length of expected firm life -- measured
from the current period forward, not from the date of firm formation -- at which the discounted
present value of the net benefits of formality (net of Pt) exactly equals po. Those firms with
expected lifetimes greater than D -- the larger firms -- would choose to participate at an early age,
e.g. TI; the smaller firms with shorter expected lifetimes would defer until a later age, e.g. T 2.
Realistically, as shown in Figure 2, the benefits of participation are likely to be greater for larger
firms. This simply accentuates the positive relationship between size and participation: larger
firms realize greater per period benefits from formality and they expect to reap those benefits
over a longer period.
Similarly, there is a positive relationship between firm age and participation. Older firms
have greater expected lifetimes because the increasingly precise estimate of their costs makes it
less and less likely that they will fail as time goes on. Consequently, older firms are also larger
on average. However, the positive relationship between age and participation is not an artifact of
larger size alone. Conditional on size, older firms have longer expected lifetimes" 5 and thus
greater potential for realizing the benefits of participation. So both firm size and age are
i5 Their  more  precise  cost estimates  mean  they are less  likely  to realize  unexpectedly  bad profits  that  would
cause  them  to reach  the failure  bound.
8positively correlated with participation: among the youngest firms, only the largest choose to
become formal; over time they are joined by smaller firms.
To summarize the predictions of our framework:
1. There is heterogeneity in the degree offormality.  The benefits and costs of
participation undoubtedly vary across societal institutions, and vary for firms of different size
and expected lifetime. While there are potential complementarities between different societal
institutions, a large number of firms will choose to participate in only a subset of institutions at
any point in time.  For exarnple, the legal system and bank financing are complements, but a firm
may have to register legally before seeking external financing. Thus informality is not an all-or-
nothing state and the degree varies by firm. This is not addressed by the other theoretical
approaches -- including models of regulatory and tax compliance that typically consider only one
dimension of participation -- but it accords with Tokman's observations (1992).
2a. Smallfirms  are disproportionately informal. They benefit least from participation
because of the small scope of their dealings with the public and hired employees (relative to the,
total volume of transactions undertaken by the firm). This has the corollary that:
2b. "Inefficient" firms are disproportionately informal. This implication is in line with
many characterizations of the informal sector (Thomas, 1992; Portes, 1994). However, in
contrast to other formulations, in this case the causality is not necessarily from informality to
inefficiency. High 0 -- i.e. high cost -- firms choose less fornality  because it benefits them less
than more efficient firms that produce at higher volumes for longer lengths of time.
2c. Young  firms  are disproportionately informal. This is partly because young firns  are
more likely to be small. Conditional on size, the population of young firms contains a
dispro]portionate  number that have not received enough signals to figure out whether paying the
costs of formality are worthwhile; many eventually will go out of business.
3. Mode of operation (type of work site) andformality  are jointly determined  Small firms
range iLn  mode of operation from ambulatory hawkers to more settled establishments. One
dimension of mode of operation, work site permanence, is not addressed by the other theoretical
models. However, a number of ad hoc characterizations -- most notably de Soto's (1989) -- draw
a strong link with informality: informal firms operate out of temporary/makeshift buildings or
9stalls, or even  door-to-door.  Firm expansion  involving  greater  capital  outlays,  K, requires  greater
permanent  work sites and, simultaneously,  greater  formality  to establish  property  rights or
formalize contracts." 6
As a second  example,  firms  of different  sizes (at different  stages  of growth)  may have
different  degrees  of interaction  with the public.  Because implicit  contracts  over product  quality
are cheaper  and feasible  to enforce  with friends and family,  the entrepreneur  may find it most
cost effective  to primarily  serve  such customers  when faced with small sales volumes.  At larger
volumes  (later in the firm's life cycle),  friends and family  cannot  necessarily  buy all the firm's
output,  so sales to the general  public and other  firms should  increase.
4a. Underlying  patterns offirm  dynamics should be comparable in both developing and
industrialized  countries.  If the distribution  of entrepreneurial  ability and the learning  process  are
similar  across  countries,  then so should  be the patterns  of firm entry  and exit. This also implies
similar firm  age distributions  and overall firm  dynamics  (assuming  comparable  economic
environments).
4b. Informal sector firms have relatively high mortality rates. The high turnover rate of
informal  firms  that might appear  as evidence  of the inferiority  of informal  employment  reflects
the high mortality  among  small firms observed  everywhere.  The high turnover  rate of such firms
and  jobs is not necessarily  related  to being informal  per se. Although  many informal  firms  will
be small mature  firms  with high costs (but not so high that they eventually  go out of business),
many will be the "false starters"  with imprecise  estimates  of their  profitability  that eventually
fail.
5. Firms participate in an increasing number of societal institutions as they grow. As
firms with a low 0 grow to their equilibrium size, the depth of participation -- measured by the
fraction  of all institutions  in which  the firm participates  or by the degree  of participation  with
each individual institution -- increases as well.
16  assumption  that  the government  can perfectly  exclude  firms  that do not voluntarily  pay the full costs
of participation  undoubtedly  is too restrictive.  Hence larger  businesses  that  have more  permanent  work sites  are
easier  for the govemment  to detect.  So participation  -- as measured  by tax compliance  and public  registry  -- will be
greater  for such firms.
10The implications  for standard  models  of tax evasion  and regulatory  compliance  are
straightforward.  Traditional  approaches  assume  that enforcement  agencies  try to maximize  social
benefit  (minimize  social  harm) subject  to a binding  budget  constraint.  Both these approaches  and
ours  predict  that large  firms (the biggest  violators  on a per unit output basis) are more  likely  to
participate.  The difference  between  approaches  lies in the determinants  of compliance:  traditional
approaches  assume  that enforcement  solely  determines  compliance;  we model  the (relative)  net
benefit to the firm. The actual importance  of gross  benefits  versus gross  (penalty)  costs is an
empirical  matter,  one that, unfortunately,  we cannot  test with our data.  However,  our approach
shows that  both costs and benefits  to the firm should  be accounted  for when attempting  to
identif  the importance  of enforcement  efforts.
Moreover,  our approach  indicates  that the duration  of an economic  activity  should  be
considered  when modeling  participation.  Traditional  approaches  to tax evasion  and regulatory
compliance  typically  ignore this issue, in part because  they consider  long-lived  economic  agents;
in particular,  firms  are viewed  as infinitely  long-lived.  However,  we have shown  that if firm
dynamics  play an important  role in the economy  -- as they appear  to do -- then  they should  be
factored  into participation  considerations.
III. Erapirical  results
1992  National  Micro Enterprises  Survey  (ENAMIN)  from  Mexico,  offers the first
comprehensive  survey  to date on compliance  with or participation  in several  distinct markers  of
formality  including  registration  with the tax authorities,  tax payment,  labor  protection,
participation  in guilds or trade associations,  and enumeration  in the census,  as well as other
relevanit  characteristics.  It thus, permits  us to generate  a reliable  picture  of the nature  of
informality,  as well as to test the consistency  of our framework  with reality.  The sample  was
generated  by selecting  approximately  11,000  individuals  from the 1991:4  National  Urban
Employment  Survey  who declared  that they were self-employed  or heads of firms  of five
workers  or fewer (fifteen  or fewer  in manufacturing).  They were reinterviewed  in the next  quarter
to generate  a more detailed  accounting  of income,  capital stock,  costs, employment  patterns,  and
a variety  of details  related  to participation  in societal  institutions.  Of the sample  of individuals
11reinterviewed in early 1992, a total of 9,036 were still operating businesses.
Our empirical approach is to seek patterns of participation that accord with the
predictions detailed in the previous section. However it should be emphasized (again) that there
is a fundamental identification problem faced both by our methodological approach and by other
approaches that assume enforcement efforts are the sole determinants of participation. We are
aware of no data set with the requisite information on both costs and benefits of participation to
evaluate the relative importance of each approach." 7 Our limited goal in this section is to
document empirically the heterogeneity and depth of participation; show the importance of firm
size, age, and mode of production as correlates of participation; and (partially) establish a role for
firm dynamics and life cycle considerations as key concerns for modeling participation (in both
developing and industrialized countries).
1. Heterogeneity of Participation
Though the data set is bounded above at five workers (fifteen in manufacturing), even
within this narrow firm size range informality is clearly not an all or nothing proposition. The
summary statistics in Table 1 show that there are high participation rates in societal institutions
for even these small firms: 41.7 percent are registered with the federal treasury, 25.2 percent are
registered with the local treasury (including Mexico City), 34.6 percent pay some taxes to one or
both treasuries, 34.6 percent of firms with paid workers have them registered with IMSS
(Mexico's social security administration), 22.5 percent are members of a business guild or
association, 15.6 percent pay dues to a business organization, and 33.1 percent of firms that
existed in 1989 were enumerated in the Census of that year.
Table 2 presents cross tabulations along several dimensions of participation and shows
that participation along one dimension need not imply participation along others.  For example,
''  Such  a data set would  have  to identify  exogenous  variation  in government  policy  that is independent  of
firms' decisions  over  formality.  This  identification  is extremely  difficult  in practice  because  most  policies are
implemented  nationwide,  confounding  the effect of policy  changes  with  business  cycle  and macroeconomic  forces
that also  influence  fmn behavior.  A differences-in-differences  approach  that utilized  between  state (or province  or
region)  variation  in policies  would  work  in principle.  But the existence  of multi-establishment  firns that cross  state
lines  would  make  assignment  into  the proper  treatment  groups  problematic.
12the bottom left panel contains  all the firms  that have  paid workers  and are greater  than three years
old, which means  that they should  be registered  with the federal  treasury,  should  have  their
(paid) workers  registered  with IMSS,  and should  have been  enumerated  in the Census.  However,
of this group only 72.9 percent  are registered  with the federal  treasury,  63.8 percent  pay taxes,
31.8 percent  participated  in the Census  but not IMSS,  while 7.2 percent  participate  in IMSS but
not the Census.
Clearly,  participation  is a question  of degree  and spans  many dimensions.  This suggests
that previous  research  that lumped  together  all small firms as representing  the informal  sector
(e.g. Rauch,  1991)  obscured  important  differences  among  them. In the interest  of avoiding  some
of the conceptual  confusion  that surrounds  the topic, it may therefore  be preferable  that future
analysis  employ  the term "informal"  to exclusively  refer  to the issues  of participation  discussed
here. '[his would leave  considerations  of firm size, wages/productivity,  labor  market
segmentation,  etc. to be addressed  under  labels that correspond  more precisely  to the phenomena
being studied. s More generally,  our evidence  indicates  that models  of regulatory  and tax
compliance  may need  to consider  possible  complementarities  between  different  institutions  when
modeling  participation  and enforcement  for individual  institutions.
2. Distribution of Formality Across Firm Characteristics
Points  2a-2c  above argue  that participation  decreases  with 0 and increases  with the
probalbility  of long run success.  Although  we cannot  observe  either,  the framework  shows  that
they are monotonically  related,  respectively,  to firm revenue/size  and to firm age (conditional  on
size). This leads  to the following  empirical  specification:
Pr(Participation) = PoConstant  + PIRevenue + f 2Age + e  (4)
where  revenue  is total firm revenue,  age is the number  of years the firm has been in business  (or
18 This is consistent with many characterizations of the informal sector (Thomas, 1992; Portes, 1994).
Strictly speaking, in our framework firms choose between different institutional arrangements (Lin and Nugent,
1995). Informality encompasses a set of institutional arrangements including enforcement of contracts through
social networks and self-insurance against employee health problems. Formality encompasses a different,
complementary set of institutional arrangements including compliance with government reporting requirements. See
also Peattie (1987) who critiques usage of the term "informal sector."
13the number  of years the current  proprietor  has been operating  it), and £ is an idiosyncratic  error
term. We measure  the probability  of participation  a number  of different  ways: (a) as an indicator
variable  for any participation  in an individual  institution,  (b) as the degree  of participation  within
a particular  institution,  and (c) as the degree  of participation  among  a range of potential
institutions.  In each case  the null hypothesis  is that: (a) 3,>0,  (b)  32>0,  that is participation  should
be an increasing  function  of both firm  size and firm age.
Table 3 shows  the rate of registration  with the federal  treasury,  the rate of registration  of
firms' paid  workers  with the social security  administration  (IMSS),  and the rate of enumeration
in the 1989  Census  by firm size and by firm  age. As predicted,  there is a very strong  positive
relationship  between  participation  and firm size/revenue.  The relationship  between  participation
and firm  age is also positive,  though much weaker.  Table  4 reports  the results from fitting  probit
regressions  for the seven  different  types of institutions.  In each case  the coefficients  on both firm
size and age are positive  and significant  at better  than the 1 percent level of confidence.  (The
standard  errors  were corrected  for arbitrary  forms of heteroskedasticity.)  The estimated  changes
in the probability  of participation  for a unit change  in each  regressor  are reported  in Table  4.A.
The relationship  between size and participation  is very strong:  each point increase  in log revenue
corresponds  to, for example,  a 20 percent greater  rate of tax compliance,  a 23 percent greater  rate
of social security  compliance,  and an 1  1 percent  greater  rate of business  guild registration.  '" The
relationship  between  age and participation  is more marginally  significant:  a ten year difference  in
age increases  participation  in the various  institutions  by 2 to 4 percent. 20
One potential  concern  is that the benefits  of participation  undoubtedly  vary by industry.
Given  systematic  differences  in average  firm  size and age across  industry,  the positive
relationships  between  size and participation  and between  age and participation  in Table  4 may be
spurious.  To test this we tried alternate  specifications  (not reported),  both including  industry
9Log revenue  was used to avoid  giving undue  weight  to the small  number  of firms  with extremely  high
levels  of revenue.
20 As a specification  check,  we  tried substituting  the two sets of dummy  variables  for the revenue  and age
classes  (from  Table 2) for the linear  terms.  The results  were qualitatively  the same  both in  these and the subsequent
regressions.
14dummies and running separate regressions by industry. The results including industry dummies
were virtually identical to those in Table 4. The industry-specific regressions, despite the
markedly reduced degrees of freedom, also yielded comparable results.
3. Mode of operation.
Table 5 reports the results from fitting equation (4) to two other measures of formality
that capture the nature of the production process jointly  determined with the level of formality:
the permanence of the firm's work site and whether individuals and families are the firm's only
main customers.  Permanent work site is a dummy variable equal to one for those firms that
operate out of a fixed site in a public marketplace, a factory, a variety/grocery store, or a retail
service establishment. 2"  Changes in probabilities are reported in Table 5.A. As expected, firm
size and age are positively (and significantly) related to work site permanence: older firms and
those producing at larger volumes require more permanent work sites.
The indicator for firms whose only main customers are individuals and families
potentially is an inverse measure of fornality.  The ideal measure would include only close
friends and family of the proprietor. The survey's measure is more broad but may still provide
evidence in favor of our framework, so long as the measure is most accurate for smaller firms.
Smaller firms should market more exclusively to close acquaintances because larger volumes of
production require firms to seek customers among the general public. The measure may be
negatively related to firm age for the same reason
The second row of Table 5 shows that, as predicted, firm size is negatively related to
whether the firm sells primarily to only individuals and families. However, the relationship with
firm age is positive. To investigate the source of that positive relationship, the bottom row of the
table reports the same regression including industry dummies. The results show that the positive
21 Only those firms operating  out of temporary  work sites  that might serve  as launching  pads for more
permanent  work sites, and those firms  operating  out of permanent  work sites  that could have transitioned  from a less
permranent  work  site, were included  in the regression.  Excluded  firms included  those operating  out of unspecified
non-permanent  or permanent  work sites.  In addition,  those whose  business  is the transportation  of people  or
merchandise,  and hotels/taverns/inns/hostels  were not included  in the regression.  Specifications  that, in turn,  (a)
included  these  firms,  and (b) limited  the definition  more  narrowly,  yielded  comparable  results.
15relationship disappears when industry dummies are included, indicating a spurious effect in the
previous regression. However, the strong negative relationship with firm size persists, providing
evidence in favor of our framework. Separate regressions by industry (not reported) yielded
similar results.
4. Firm dynamics
To fully test the dynamics of our framework would require longitudinal data. Though the
ENAMIN is the most comprehensive data source available to date, it lacks this dimension.
Nonetheless, the cross sectional evidence it does offer is consistent with our framework. First,
though the data is truncated at a firm size of five employees (fifteen in manufacturing), long
lived firms exist across the revenue distribution, reflecting the underlying distribution of 0.
Remarkably, average firm age is roughly the same across all deciles of the revenue distribution,
ranging from a low of 7.9 years for the seventh decile to a high of 9.0 years for the second decile;
the first and last deciles have respective means of 8.8 and 8.7 years. 22 Moreover, the relatively
uniform revenue-age distribution is not an artifact of the upper limit on number of employees:
average firm revenue in the last revenue decile is more than eighty times larger than the first
revenue decile. This suggests that this population of firms may be in a steady state, with entry
and exit rates roughly uniform across the revenue distribution. 23
Second, the observed patterns of firm entry and exit are consistent with those predicted
by our framework and with those observed in the U.S. and in other developing countries.
Numerous studies have documented high entry and failure rates among startups that decline with
size and age of the firm. 24 Evans and Leighton's (1989) study of self-employment dynamics in
22 The difference  in average  firm  age between  the second  and seventh  deciles  is statistically  significant  at a
five percent level of confidence.  The difference  between  the first and last deciles  is not.
23 Note that "exit" could  happen for two reasons.  The upper  size limit on number  of employees  means  that
firms would  leave the sample  frame  either if they failed  or if they added  too many employees.  Smaller  firms
undoubtedly  are more likely  to fail;  whereas  larger  firms are more likely  to grow their way out of the sample  frame.
24  Mansfield  (1962) shows  that smaller  firms have  higher and more  variable  growth  rates. Dunne,  et al.
(1989) demonstrate that U.S. manufacturing plant failure rates decline steadily with the age of the plant. Davis, et al.
(1994) find  that net job creation  in small  U.S. manufacturing  firms is not high relative  to large businesses,  despite
16the U.S. provides the most comparable benchmark for our analysis. They find that inflows into
self-employment over the previous year account for about 20 percent of self-employment for
men over 35, with an even greater proportion for younger men. This is consistent with a constant
rate of entry and older men running more established firms that are less likely to fail. Evans and
Leighton also document a sharply decreasing exit rate from self-employment for the U.S., with
the probability of failure ranging from 15 percent for the oldest of the self-employed to over 50
percent for the youngest of the self-employed.
The overall patterns of firm age by age of the owner for Mexico in Table 6 are
comparable. The last two sets of columns in Table 6 show the fraction and number of firms at
each age range that are no more than one year and two years old, respectively. Consistent with
Evans and Leighton's estimates, the number of entries is relatively flat throughout the life cycle.
Yet the fraction of the self employed comprised of new entrants declines steadily, commensurate
with a sharp increase in average firm age. Together, these patterns suggest that declining exit
rates are probably partially responsible for the sharp increase in average firm age in these data. 25
These broad similarities in self-employment dynamics between Mexico and the U.S. suggest that
common determinants of self-employment may be as important as differing institutional factors
in explaining the observed patterns of participation.
5. Depth ofparticipation
Our approach predicts that firms participate in an increasing number of institutions as
they grow. Again, because the ENAMIN lacks a longitudinal dimension, we cannot directly test
the time series implications. However, the cross sectional implications are supported by the data.
inordinately  high  rates of gross  job creation,  because  of their disproportionately  high rates of job destruction.
Roberts  and Tybout  (forthcoming)  find  that in Mexico,  Colombia  and Morocco  business  births and failures  are even
more  frequent  and  numerous  in those countries  than in the U.S., accounting  for much larger  shares  of total
employrment  adjustment.  New  plants are much smaller  and less  productive  than the industry  average  and the failure
rate is highest  at young  ages.
25 Evans  and Leighton  do not report average  firm  age by age of the owner,  making  direct  comparison  with
the numbers  in Table 6 difficult.  However,  if we assume  that the exit probabilities  in their data apply
disproportionately  to the very  young  firms within  each age cohort, a likely phenomenon  given  the learning  process,
then average  firm age must rise with age of the owner,  as in Table 6.
17The depth of participation -- as measured by degree of compliance -- is analyzed in Table
7. Twio  measures are used: the fraction of the firm's paid workers registered with IMSS (for the
subset of firms with any paid workers), and the fraction of all institutions in which the firm
participates. Both variables are bounded below by zero and above by one, so the estimation used
double-censored tobits. 26 The second and third rows of the table report two different
specifications for the fraction of all institutions in which the firm participates. The first
encompasses all seven institutions in Table 4. The second excludes business guild registration
and dues payment because not all firms may have access to such institutions; i.e. differences
between firms in participation along this dimension may simply represent cross-industry
differences in production technology or market structure.
The patterns in Table 7 again are consistent with our prediction that the depth of
participation is an increasing function of both firm size and age. Excluding business guild
registration and dues payment in the third row makes these relationships stronger.  The inclusion
of industry dummies (not reported) leaves the results largely unchanged.
IV. Relation  to Previous Informal Sector Research
The framework offered here departs from the premise that the small scale firms found in
developing countries are fundamentally different from those in industrialized countries. Thus, it
is solidly in the spirit of Hart (1972) and de Soto who stressed the intrinsic dynamism of the
sector. In conceiving of formality as an input into the production function and that firms choose
the optimal level along a continuum, we provide a theoretical underpinning both for Tokman's
grey areas of partial compliance, and for de Soto's view that a lack of access to institutions is a
binding constraint on firm growth.
De Soto claimed that onerous compliance costs prevent firms from becoming formal.
This concern was echoed by Porter (1995) who cited high and uncertain regulatory costs as
barriers to firm growth in United States inner cities. Both of these perspectives are easily nested
in our framework as a case where the government sets po so high that for most firms the
26 Ordinary least squares regressions yielded comparable results.
18discounted  net present  value of participation  never exceeds  its costs. But our model  also implies
that it may never be possible  to induce  all finns to participate  simply  by streamlining  compliance
procedures:  for many very small firms,  the benefits  of participation  may not exceed  even  modest
costs. 2 '
By relaxing  our stylized  view of the well functioning  "market"  for formality,  we can
encompass  both Rauch's and Loayza's views.  Clearly,  reality is more complex  than our extreme
assumption  that firms get only the participation  they pay for and pay for none they do not want.
Many institutions  of civic society  are public  goods and the government  imposes  universal  fiscal
levies,  making  tax evasion  attractive.  Moreover,  an enforcement  agency  seeking  to maximize
social benefit  could easily choose  to focus its efforts  on longstanding,  large firms, leaving  the
door open for small,  low productivity  firms  to avoid  taxation  and regulation.  Rauch,  in fact,
defines  the informal  sector  as those firms  of a size below  which  the government  chooses  not to
enforce  minimum  wages.  Incorporating  this into our perspective,  a growing  firm may  willingly
choose  to comply  with such size-based  regulations  in order  to get unimpeded  access  to necessary
institutions. 28
The logic behind  Esfahani  and Salehi-Isfahani's  model  (1989)  is also consistent  with the
view presented  here. Larger  firms  use more complex  production  technologies  as they grow,
making  worker  monitoring  more difficult.  They thus voluntarily  pay efficiency  wages  that, in
practice,  may include  health care  or other benefits,  to reduce  shirking.  Again, more efficient
firms  would  become  increasingly  formal  as they grow.  But formality  of the firm  is an
independent  consideration  from the wages  it pays its workers:  a small,  longstanding  firm that
does not pay efficiency  wages  likely  would  participate  in formal  institutions  such as the legal and
banking  systems. 29
Finally,  there is nothing  in the static  nature  of previous  models  that makes them
27 See Ozorio  de Almeida,  et aL.  (1994)  for a discussion  of deregulating  the informal  sector.
28 In this example,  the cost of complying  with  the minimum  wage is part of po  and pt.
29 Both Schaffner  (1996) and Velenchik  (1996) have  documented  a positive  firm-size  wage effect for Peru
and Zirnbabwe.  Such an effect  is a critical  component  of Esfahani  and Salehi-Isfahani's  efficiency  wage  model.
However,  both  of the former  authors  argue  that such evidence  is not supportive  of that class of model.
19inconsistent  with the approach  described  here. For instance,  both Rauch and Loayza  require an
exogenous  change  in government  policy  to induce  transitions  between  the formal  and informal
sectors.  But this arises  purely  because  they were not concerned  witi modeling  firn dynamics.
Within  the context of our approach,  such a policy  change  is equivalent  to altering  pa and/or  p,
which  leads  to comparable  comparative  static  results as those described  in both Rauch and
Loayza.
Conclusion
Using a unique  data set from Mexico,  we have provided  a more detailed  characterization
of the nature  of informal  production  than previously  possible.  Beyond  the empirical  regularities,
we also  have offered  a new approach  to analyzing  the informal  sector.  This approach  assumes
that informal  firms  in developing  countries  behave  similarly  to those  in the industrialized
countries,  and is based  on a model  of firm dynamics  frequently  used in the industrial
organization  literature.  It offers an alternative  motivation  for informality  which,  unlike  much of
the literature  on tax evasion  and regulatory  compliance,  asserts  that participation  in societal
institutions  may  be essential  to growth,  and therefore  at least  partially voluntary.  It also can nest
many existing  models  that base existence  of the informal  sector  solely on institutional
distortions,  market  failures,  or excessive  government  regulation.  Though  the data do not permit a
definitive  test of competing  models,  they are consistent  with the predictions  of our approach.
This suggests  that our framework  is an important  benchmark  to be considered  when analyzing
the informal  sector and regulatory  compliance.
References
Ashenfelter,  Orley  and Robert  S. Smith (1979),  "Compliance  with the Minimum  Wage Law,"
Journal of Political Economy, 87:2, 333-350.
Banerji,  Arup and Sanjay  Jain (1996),  "Quality Dualism  and the Informal  Sector,"  mimeo.
Besley,  Timothy  (1995),  "Savings,  Credit  and Insurance,"  in J. Behrman  and T.N. Srinivasan,
eds., Handbook of Development Economics, Volume III, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
20Cowell, Frank A. (1990), Cheating the Government, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Davis, Steven J., John Haltiwanger, and Scott Schuh (1994), "Small Business and Job Creation:
Dissecting the Myth and Reassessing the Facts," in Lewis C. Solmon and Alec R. Levenson,
eds., Labor Markets, Employment Policy, and Job Creation, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
Dunne, Timothy, Mark J. Roberts, and Larry Samuelson (1989), "The Growth and Failure of
U.S. Manufacturing Plants," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104:4, 671-698.
The Economist (1996), "Not-so-wondrous pensions," December 14, p. 46.
Esfahani, Hadi S. and Djavad Salehi-Isfahani (1989), "Effort Observability and Worker
Productivity: Towards an Explanation of Economic Dualism," The Economic Journal, 99, 818-
836.
Evans, David S. and Linda S. Leighton (1989), "Some Empirical Aspects of Entrepreneurship,"
American Economic Review, 79:3, 519-535.
Fenn, P. and C. G. Veljanovski (1988), "A Positive Economic Theory of Regulatory
Enforcement," The Economic Journal, 98, 1055-1070.
Fishback, Price V. and Shawn Everett Kantor (1996), "The Adoption of Workers' Compensation
in the UJnited  States, 1900-1930," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 5840.
Gruber, Jonathan (1994), "The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits," American Economic
Review.,  84:3, 622-641.
Harris, John R. and Michael P. Todaro (1970), "Migration, Unemployment, and Development: A
Two-Sector Analysis," American Economic Review, 60:1, 126-142.
Hart, Kieth (1  972), Employment, Income and Inequality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive
Employment in Kenya, Geneva: ILO.
Jovanovic, Boyan (1982), "Selection and Evolution of Industry," Econometrica, 649-670.
Lewis, W.A. (1954), "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour," Manchester
School of Economics and Social Studies, 20, 139-191.
Lin, Justin Yifu and Jeffrey B. Nugent, "Institutions and Economic Development," in J. Behrnan
and T.N. Srinivasan, eds., Handbook of Development Economics, Volume III, Amsterdam:
Elsevier.
Lippmtn, S.A. and R.P. Rumelt (1992), "Uncertain Imitability: An Analysis of Interfirm
21Differences in Efficiency under Competition," Bell Journal of Economics, 13:2, 418-438.
Loayza, Norman V. (1995), "The Economics of the Informal Sector: A Simple Model and Some
Empirical Evidence from Latin America," mimeo.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. (1978), "On the Size Distribution of Business Firms," Bell Journal of
Economics, 9:2, 508-23.
Ozorio de Almeida, A.L. and S.E.M Graham and L.F. Alves (1994). "Poverty, Deregulation and
Informal Employment in Mexico," ESP Working Paper, World Bank.
Palay, Thomas M. (1984), "Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail
Freight Contracting," Journal of Legal Studies, 13, 265-287.
Palay, Thomas M. (1985), "Avoiding Regulatory Constraints: Contracting Safeguards and the
Role of Informal Agreements," Journal ofLaw,  Economics, and Organization, 1, 155-175.
Peattie, Lisa (1987), "An Idea in Good Currency and How It Grew: The Informal Sector," World
Development, 15:7 851-860.
Porter, Michael E. (1995), "The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City," Harvard Business
Review, 73:3, 55-71.
Portes, Alejandro (1994), "The Informal Economy and Its Paradoxes," in Neil J. Smelser and
Richard Swedberg, eds., The Handbook of Economic Sociology, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press.
Rauch, James E. (1991), "Modeling the Informal Sector Formally," Journal of Development
Economics, 35:1, 33-47.
Roberts, Mark J. and James R. Tybout (forthcoming), Industrial Evolution in Developing
Countries: Micro Patterns of Turnover, Productivity and Market Structure, New York: Oxford
University Press.
Schaffner, Julie Anderson (1996), "Premiums to Employment in Larger Establishments: Evidence
from Peru," mimeo, forthcoming Journal of Development Economics.
de Soto, Hemando (1989), The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World,  New York:
Harper and Row.
Thomas, J.J. (1992),  Informal Economic Activity, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
Tokman, Victor E. (1992), "The Informal Sector in Latin America: From Underground to Legality,"
22in Victor E. Tokman,  ed., Beyond  Regulation:  The  Informal  Economy  in Latin  America, Boulder,
Coloracdo:  Lynne Rienner  Publishers.
Velenchik,  Ann D. (1996),  "Government  Intervention,  Efficiency  Wages,  and the Employer  Size
Wage Effect  in Zimbabwe,"  mimeo,  forthcoming  Journal  of Development  Economics.
23Revenue
Firm  type  #1
Firm  type  #2
K~~~~~~~  -
i____  X_  Firm  type  #3
Time  in Business
Figure 1
24Revenue  F  #
With  participation
Without  participation
I  /  /  Firm type #2
|  !/  _  With  participation
Without  participation
==  - Firmtype#3
T,  T 2 Time in Business
Figure 2
25Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable  Mean  S.D.  Min  Max  N
Total Revenue  3668  8145  2  200000  8873
Log(total  revenue)  7.42  1.19  .693  12.2  8873
Net Income  1260  3138  -78498  126300  8807
Years in Business  8.58  9.37  .167  51  9033
Numrber  of paid  workers  .384  1.08  0.00  15  9036
Any paid  workers  .193  .395  0.00  1  9036
Number  of unpaid  workers  .232  .601  0.00  5  9036
Any unpaid  workers  .164  .370  0.00  1  9036
Registered  with federal  treasury  .417  .493  0.00  1  9036
Registered  with local treasury  .252  .434  0.00  1  9036
Amount  of taxes paid  78.5  552  0.00  30000  8401
Paid any taxes  .346  .476  0.00  1  9036
Any paid workers  registered  with IMSS  .346  .476  0.00  1  1748
Number  of paid workers  registered  with IMSS  .318  .451  0.00  1  1748
Business  registered  with guild or association  .225  .418  0.00  1  9036
Amount  of business  organization  dues paid  7.04  43.8  0.00  1500  9019
Any business  organization  dues paid  .156  .363  0.00  1  9036
Enumerated  in the 1989  Census  .331  .471  0.00  1  5220
Fraction  of all institutions  .279  .301  0.00  1  9036
Fraction  of all institutions  (excluding  guild, dues)  .325  .371  0.00  1  9036
Types of work site:
Transportation:  people or merchandise  .064  .245  0.00  1  9036
Makeshift  stand in a public  road  .041  .199  0.00  1  9036
Fixed stand in a public  road  .017  .130  0.00  1  9036
Makeshift  stand inside  a marketplace  .023  .149  0.00  1  9036
Fixed stand forming  part of a marketplace  .019  .138  0.00  1  9036
Door-to-door  or street  vendor  .045  .207  0.00  1  9036
Services  offered  via vehicle  or cart  .034  .181  0.00  1  9036
Own home:  without  specialized  equipment  .123  .328  0.00  1  9036
Own home:  with specialized  equipment  .051  .220  0.00  1  9036
Other non-permanent  work site  .008  .088  0.00  1  9036
Fixed work  site in a public marketplace  .032  .176  0.00  1  9036
Hotel,  tavern,  inn or hostel  .0006  .024  0.00  1  9036
Factory:  production  or repair services  .095  .293  0.00  1  9036
Variety or grocery  store  .075  .263  0.00  1  9036
Retail  service  establishment  .131  .338  0.00  1  9036
Other permanent  work site  .008  .091  0.00  1  9036
Home  of customer  or client  .233  .423  0.00  1  9036
Permanent work site  .485  .500  0.00  1  6194
Family/friends only main customers  .384  .486  0.00  1  9036
26Table 2: The Varying Degrees of Formality
Incidence  of Registration  with Federal Treasury and Payment of Taxes by Various Firm Characteristics
I  Firms registered  r  Firns  registered
All firms  with local treasury  with business guild or organization
#firrns  % firms  % regis  %  %  %  % pay
in this  in this  with fed  pay  %  fed  pay  %  % fed  % pay  guild/
group  group  treasury  taxes  firms  firms  treas  taxes  firms  firms  treas  taxes  org dues
1. All firms  9036  100.0  41.7  34.6  2273  100.0  78.8  74.0  2035  100.0  67.7  54.0  61.4
2. Paid workers>0  1748  100.0  73.1  61.3  690  100.0  91.6  79.6  573  100.0  88.0  72.1  57.4
2.A. and IMSS=0  1144  65.4  61.5  50.9  396  57.4  87.1  74.7  282  49.2  97.9  82.5  58.8
2.B. and IMSS>0  604  34.6  95.0  81.1  294  42.6  97.6  86.1  291  50.8  77.7  61.3  56.0
3. Inbusiness>3 years  5220  100.0  42.8  37.1  1365  100.0  79.1  76.3  1284  100.0  68.8  56.9  62.6
3.A. not in 1989 Census  3493  66.9  20.1  18.5  482  35.3  55.6  63.3  637  49.6  46.3  37.4  64.2
3.B. and in 1989 Census  1727  33.1  88.8  74.8  883  64.7  92.0  83.4  647  50.4  91.0  76.0  61.1
4. Pd wkrs>0, >3 years  1096  100.0  72.9  63.8  440  100.0  92.7  82.7  378  100.0  89.2  75.1  58.7
4.A. IMSS no, Census no  348  31.8  31.0  28.4  68  15.5  77.9  75.0  62  16.4  61.3  48.4  62.9
4.B. IMSS yes, Census no  79  7.20  86.1  74.7  26  5.91  100  80.8  34  8.99  97.1  73.5  50.0
4.C. IMSS no, Census yes  337  30.7  88.4  77.2  168  38.2  92.9  81.0  110  29.1  88.2  76.4  54.5
4.D. IMSS yes, Census yes  332  30.3  97.9  84.6  178  40.5  97.2  87.6  172  45.5  98.3  84.3  61.6
Only those firms in business for more than three years could have been enumerated  in the 1989 Census of businesses. IMSS refers to registration of the firm's paid workers
with the Mexican Social Security administration. Only paid workers have to be registered with IMSS.
27Table 3:  Summary Statistics
The Relationship between Formality and Firm Size and Age
Registered  with  Any workers  registered  Enumerated  in
federal  treasury  with IMSS  1989  Census
Revenue decile  Mean  Obs  Mean  Obs  Mean  Obs
1st decile  .080  889  0  6  .087  472
2nddecile  .125  910  0  11  .109  512
3rd decile  .184  917  0  19  .136  523
4th decile  .257  1197  .024  84  .196  730
5th decile  .401  558  .075  67  .299  341
6th decile  .444  1024  .102  167  .317  590
7th decile  .581  816  .219  206  .444  441
8th decile  .600  788  .279  219  .442  443
9th decile  .710  909  .331  381  .547  537
10th decile  .855  865  .606  538  .751  535
Registered with  Any workers  registered  Enumerated  in
federal treasury  with IMSS  1989 Census
Years in business  Mean  Obs  Mean  Obs  Mean  Obs
less than one year  .323  876  .237  131  0  0
1 year  .374  838  .221  131  0  0
2 years  .416  1094  .343  181  0  0
3 years  .455  857  .345  171  0  0
4 years  .463  559  .391  110  .309  537
5 years  .432  562  .336  125  .309  538
6to7years  .411  672  .397  156  .316  648
8 to 9 years  .401  504  .290  100  .287  492
10 to  12 years  .441  975  .415  193  .312  952
13 to 15 years  .416  551  .418  122  .353  541
16 to 19  years  .467  304  .333  69  .391  297
20 to 29 years  .438  765  .321  159  .359  744
30 years or more  .435  476  .414  99  .376  468
28Table 4.  Participation in societal institutions
Dependent variable  Log revenue  Years in business  Pseudo R 2 # obs
Registered with federal treasury  .661  .006  0.200  8870
(37.7)  (3.95)
Registered with local treasury  .371  .006  0.083  8870
(26.9)  (3.57)
Pays any taxes  .556  .008  0.158  8870
(35.6)  (5.35)
Any paid workers registered with  .634  .010  0.161  1697
IMSS  (17.2)  (2.95)
Enumerated in 1989 census  .538  .013  0.154  5121
(26.5)  (6.26)
Registered with business  .383  .006  0.090  8870
guild/organization  (26.8)  (3.87)
Pays any dues  .312  .007  0.066  8870
(21.6)  (4.02)
Probit  regressions. Absolute  values  of z statistics  in parentheses. The standard  errors  have been  corrected  for
arbitrary  forms  of heteroskedasticity.
Table 4.A.  Participation in societal institutions
(difference in probabilities from a one unit change in the regressor)
Dependent variable  Log revenue  Years in business
Registered with federal treasury  .254  .002
Registered with local treasury  .113  .002
Pays any taxes  .199  .003
Any paid workers registered with  .226  .004
IMSS
Enumerated in 1989 census  .188  .004
Registered with business  .108  .002
guild/organization
Pays any dues  .070  .002
29Table 5.  Other measures of formality
Dependent variable  Log revenue  Years in business  Pseudo R2  # obs
Permanence of work site  .538  .009  0.162  6066
(31.3)  (4.97)
Families/individuals only main  -.277  .007  0.048  8870
clients  (22.9)  (4.63)
Families/individuals only main  -.208  -.001  0.176  8868
clients (adding industry  (15.1)  (0.63)
dummies)
Probit  regressions.  Absolute  values  of z statistics  in  parentheses. The standard  errors  have  been corrected  for
arbitrary  forms  of heteroskedasticity.
Table 5.A. Other measures of formality
(difference in probabilities from a one unit change in the regressor)
Dependent variable  Log revenue  Years in business
Permanence of work site  .214  .004
Families/individuals only main  -.105  .003
clients
Families/individuals only main  -.078  -.0004
clients (adding industry dummies)
30Table 6: Distribution of Firm Age by Age of the Owner
Years in  Years in Business:  Years in Business:
Business  One year or less  Two years or less
Age of Owner  Mean  Mean  Frequency  Mean  Frequency
19 or,younger  2.61  .524  99  .693  131
20 to 24  2.86  .366  191  .573  299
25 to 29  3.96  .277  253  .462  421
30 to '34  4.96  .233  268  .380  437
35 to .39  6.41  .193  250  .325  420
40 to 44  7.90  .168  196  .283  329
45 to 49  9.53  .138  138  .251  251
50to'54  11.5  .128  117  .191  174
55 to 159  12.8  .116  75  .199  129
60 to 69  15.8  .107  91  .180  153
70 or older  17.8  .086  33  .153  59
Table 7.  Depth of participation in societal institutions
Depexndent  variable  Log revenue  Years in business  Pseudo R2 # obs
Fraction of paid workers  2.84  .051  0.115  1697
registered with IMSS  (9.15)  (2.86)
Fraction of all institutions in  .245  .004  0.211  8870
which the firm participates  (52.2)  (7.17)
Fraction of all institutions,  .386  .005  0.145  8870
exclucding  business guild  (44.6)  (5.53)
registration and dues
Tobit  regressions. Absolute  values  of t statistics  in parentheses.
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